Abstract: Article 12 of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction allows an abducting parent to avoid the return of the child if the parent can show that more than a year has passed since the wrongful removal or retention of the child, and that the child is well settled in his or her new environment. In cases where concealment of the abducted child prevented a parent from filing a claim within one year of the abduction, the U.
Introduction
Estelle Bocquet and Kamal Ouzid had a child together in Miami, Florida in 1996.1 The couple lived with their child, Noe, in Miami from 1996 to 1998.2 In 1999, Bocquet returned to France and enrolled Noe in a French preschool.3 The family lived together in France until Au-gust 2000.4 Then, one day, Bocquet returned home from work to find that Ouzid had taken Noe to Algeria.5 Bocquet quickly filed a complaint with the police, and attempted to exercise her custodial rights through a French-Algerian Treaty.6 Bocquet also tried to visit her son in Algeria, but Ouzid and his family refused to help her obtain the necessary visa.7 Bocquet finally obtained a visa to visit Algeria, but Ouzid left for America with Noe on the same day that Bocquet arrived in Algeria.8 After more than a year without seeing her child, Bocquet travelled to Miami in October 2001 and Ouzid finally allowed her to have a supervised visit with Noe.9 In March 2002, Bocquet obtained a French divorce decree that awarded her sole custody of Noe.10 With this decree in hand, Bocquet filed a petition in an American court under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (Convention), which allows a court to order the prompt return of a child who has been removed in violation of a foreign custody order.11 Accordingly, Bocquet was finally allowed to advocate for the return of her child, but more than a year after his removal. 12 Bocquet's agonizing experience is one of many cases that illustrate the human aspect that prompted both the adoption of the Convention and the decision of the United States to ratify it.13 Despite the Conven- 7 Bocquet, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 1342 (explaining that in order for a non-Algerian to obtain an Algerian visa, an Algerian landowner must extend an invitation).
8 Id. 9 Id. Bocquet was allowed to visit with Noe over a period of ten days. Id. These visits were permitted only in public places and in the presence of Ouzid. Id. During the month leading up to the visits, Ouzid and the former couple's mutual friends continued to refuse to give her Noe and Ouzid's address. Id. 10 Id. at 1343. tion's goal of deterring the wrongful removal of children, under normal circumstances Bocquet would have no recourse available because of an exception found in Article 12 of the Convention that was available to Ouzid: the well-settled defense.14 Under the well-settled defense, a court may refuse to return a child if the respondent shows by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the petition was filed more than a year after the alleged wrongful removal; and (2) the child is settled in his or her new environment.15 This defense recognizes that the swift return of a child following a prolonged absence, without a judicial review of the merits of the custody claims, may not always be in the child's best interests. 16 Despite the fact that Noe was retained in violation of Bocquet's custodial rights for more than a year before Bocquet filed her petition under the Convention, in 2002 in Bocquet v. Ouzid, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida held that the well-settled defense should not apply to Noe's abduction because of the doctrine of equitable tolling.17 Guided by this doctrine, the court concluded that the one-year period under the well-settled defense should not start until the date when Bocquet learned of Noe's address in the United States.18 As such, the court determined that Bocquet's petition had been filed within the one-year period, and therefore Ouzid was barred from raising the well-settled defense. 19 Equitable tolling can render inapplicable the well-settled defense simply by manipulating the timing of the case, rather than determining whether or not the child is well settled.20 Because the application of equitable tolling manipulates the start of the one-year clock, it eviscer-14 Bocquet, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 1348. This Note refers to this defense as the "well-settled defense" or the "Article 12 defense," though it is also known as the "settled defense" or "now-settled defense."
15 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e); Convention, supra note 11, art. 12.
16 Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 458. 17 Bocquet, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 1348 (citing Lops v. Lops, 140 F.3d 927, 946 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting that the district court had applied equitable tolling because it could not imagine a federal statute that did not apply such a doctrine in situations where the wrongdoer's actions caused the delay in the commencement of proceedings); see infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text (describing the doctrine of equitable tolling).
18 Bocquet, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 1348. 19 Id. 20 See, e.g., id. Of course, in some situations, even if a court equitably tolls the one-year period until the petitioner discovers the child, the petitioner's filing could still be untimely. See Anderson v. Acree, 250 F. Supp. 2d 872, 875 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (holding that equitable tolling was inapplicable, but noting that even if the doctrine were applicable, the petition would still be untimely because it was filed more than a year after the discovery of the child's whereabouts).
ates the purpose of the well-settled defense: to leave in place children who have been living in their new environment for over one year.21 The Bocquet court reasoned---as have other American courts---that without equitable tolling, the well-settled defense would serve to encourage the concealment of abducted children.22 The Bocquet court also joined some of its sister courts in analogizing the one-year period to a statute of limitations, and noted that equitable tolling is traditionally read into federal statutes containing such limitations.23 Accordingly, these courts placed the deterrence of wrongful removal, and therefore the custodial rights of the left-behind parent, above the interests of the abducted child in maintaining the stability of his or her new environment. 24 Although courts are well-intentioned in adopting this approach to the well-settled defense, other courts are critical of the application of equitable tolling in such cases.25 These latter courts have reasoned that the drafters of the Convention unambiguously included the one-year time period in recognition that it might be in the best interest of the child to remain with the abducting parent when he or she has lived in 21 See infra notes 121--140 and accompanying text. this new environment for such a long time.26 To justify this conclusion, courts have noted the lack of support for equitable tolling in the Convention's text and its drafting history.27 Moreover, these courts have explained that the analogy to a statute of limitations is inapt because unlike in the case of a statute of limitations-in which a person's right to redress is terminated at the statute's expiration date-the Convention continues to require the return of the child after the one-year period expires.28 The goals of the Convention, and the interests of children like Noe, would be better served by a more thorough application of the second prong of the well-settled defense: the inquiry into whether the child is settled in his or her new environment.29 The second prong of the defense allows for a more probing analysis of what is in the best interests of the child in a manner that is both faithful to the Convention's texts and goals, and, like the application of equitable tolling, should deter the concealment of children.30
Despite the good intentions of the courts that apply equitable tolling to the well-settled defense, courts should ultimately not read equitable tolling into the Convention.31 The text and the drafting history directly contradict the application of this doctrine to the well-settled defense.32 In applying this doctrine, courts have prioritized the interests of the left-behind parent over the interests of the child.33 The proper balance of both the parent's and the child's interests, however, is already provided for in the second prong of the Convention's well- Part I of this Note begins by exploring the text, drafting history, and purposes of the well-settled defense.36 Part I then gives an overview of the doctrine of equitable tolling, and how American courts have applied it to the well-settled defense.37 Part II highlights the problems in applying equitable tolling to this defense.38 Part III argues that the current American approach in applying equitable tolling favors parental rights over the child's rights and best interests.39 It also contends that courts applying equitable tolling are being guided in part by the American legal tradition of placing the rights of parents over the rights of children.40 Part IV recommends that the U.S. Supreme Court reject equitable tolling and instead require courts to take into account the concealment of
State of American J on the Convention
Bocquet's ordeal is one of a growing number of stories of international child abduction.42 There are many reasons why parents may be motivated to abduct their child in contravention of a former partner's custody rights: as a way to protect what they view as the child's best interests; as revenge on their ex-spouse or partner; as a way to continue contact with an ex-spouse or partner; or as a way to avoid domestic violence. . Abduction can upset a child's sense of security and stability. Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 432. Children who are abducted can experience a sense of loss triggered by the sudden deprivation of relationships and their home environment. Freeman, supra, at 605; Wills, supra note 42, at 429. Children may also experience a sense of guilt for not contacting the left-behind parent. Freeman, supra, at 608. In addition, children may experience isolation stemming from a difficulty with the social and linguistic skills required in a new and unfamiliar culture. Id. at 604. One study conducted interviews with five children between the ages of six and eleven who had been abducted when they were between six and forty-two months old. Id. at 607-08. The study found that the amount of trauma a child experiences depends on the age of the child when abducted, how the abductor treats the child, how long the abduction continues, the child's lifestyle and experiences during the abduction, and the type of support and therapy received once returned. Id. at 608. Significantly, the study concluded that longer abductions resulted in a more traumatic end to the abduction. Id. at 609. 52 42 U.S.C. § § 11601-11611 (2006). 53 See id. To initiate the process of seeking the return of a child who has been wrongfully removed or retained, an application must be filed with a Central Authority. Convention, supra note 11, art. 8. The application must contain information concerning: the identity of the applicant; the child and the person who allegedly wrongfully removed the child; the date of birth of the child; the grounds on which the applicant's claim for return of the child are based; and the whereabouts of the child. Id. The application may also include a copy of decisions or agreements relating to the child's custody. Convention, supra note 11, art. 8. Similarly, an application may also contain a statement of the relevant law from the left-behind parent's state. Id. applicant must first file an application with the Department of State, and then initiate judicial proceedings.54 To initiate judicial proceedings, the petitioner must file a petition in the federal or state court that has jurisdiction over the child's location. 55 The Convention permits a number of defenses that are meant to address situations in which the immediate return of the child would not be in the child's best interests.56 Accordingly, if a court finds that the respondent has successfully pled any of the defenses, the court may exercise its discretion to refuse to return a child, but does not have a duty to refuse the return.57 The well-settled defense is one such defense that, as demonstrated in the Bocquet case, applies when the respondent shows that the petition was filed more than a year after the child's wrongful removal or retention.58
As evident in Bocquet, courts faced with the well-settled defense have grappled with the decision of whether equitable tolling should be applied.59 This Part explores the various approaches American courts have taken with regard to equitable tolling of the one-year filing rule.60 56 Convention, supra note 11, arts. 12, 13, 17, 20; see Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 432. There are six defenses to the immediate return of a child. See Convention, supra note 11, arts. 12, 13, 17, 20. One such defense is that return would expose the child to a grave risk of physical or psychological harm. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e); see Convention, supra note 11, art. 13. Another defense is that return would violate the fundamental protections of human rights and freedoms of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e); Convention, supra note 11, art. 20. The court may also refuse return if the child objects to returning and the court finds that the child is of an age and maturity at which it is appropriate to consider his or her views. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e); Convention, supra note 11, art. 13. The respondent could also show that the petitioner was not exercising his or her custody or access rights at the time of removal, or that he or she subsequently acquiesced to the removal. 42 U.S.C.
§ 11603(e); Convention, supra note 11, art. 13. If the abducting parent has obtained a custody decision in the United States, a court hearing a Convention petition can consider the reasoning underlying the U.S. custody decision, but cannot refuse return of the child solely because of the decision. See Convention, supra note 11, art. 17. 57 Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 460; see Convention, supra note 11, art. 18. There is some debate over whether courts can return a child after an affirmative defense has been demonstrated. Compare Yaman, 730 F.3d at 16-21 (analyzing the Convention and holding that a court does have the authority to return a child after the well-settled defense is successfully established), with Weiner, supra note 25, at 479--82 (examining the scholarly debate and arguing that the Convention does not give the court discretion to refuse to return a child where one of the defenses has been proven). Section A introduces the text, drafting history, and purpose of the wellsettled defense, as well as a preliminary examination of equitable tolling.61 Section B explains how American courts have approached the application of equitable tolling to the well-settled defense.62
A. The Well-Settled Defense and Equitable Tolling
The drafters of the Convention included the well-settled defense to recognize that the swift return of a child following a prolonged abduction, without a judicial review of the merits of the custody claims, may not always be in the best interest of the child. 63 The drafters also included the one-year limit to avoid the difficult task of articulating a test that would measure if the child has become integrated in the new environment. 64 The one-year time period is measured from the date of the wrongful removal or retention of the child to the date the leftbehind parent commences proceedings.65 Under ICARA, the proceedings commence when the petition is filed in the court of appropriate jurisdiction in the United States.66
The language of the Convention makes clear that a court's obligation to return a child continues beyond the one-year time limit if it cannot be shown that the child is settled in his or her current familial and social environment.67 Although the Convention does not list the factors that courts should use when evaluating whether a child is well settled, the burden of proving that the child is well settled rests with the abductor. 68 The Department of State has interpreted the Convention to require substantial evidence of significant connections that the child has made to his or her new location. 69 This defense generated considerable debate when the member states of the Hague Conference first considered it. 70 The continuing obligation of return after the one-year period was added in response to the concerns of some states that the one-year limit would form an inflexible boundary of the Convention's applicability.71 The drafters ultimately ignored the U.S. concern that the one-year limit would be unworkable in a large country like the United States, where commencement of proceedings requires the difficult task of finding the precise jurisdiction in which the child is located.72
The member states rejected an earlier approach that would have provided for a different time limit for concealed children.73 Specifically, the preliminary draft of the Hague Convention provided that if the child's whereabouts were known, the time limit was six months from the wrongful removal.74 If the child's whereabouts were concealed, the six-month period would run from when the child was discovered, but proceedings would still have to commence within one year of the wrongful removal.75 Ultimately, the Convention incorporated a single time limit under the well-settled defense for all abductions.76 In doing so, the signatory states rejected the preliminary draft of the Convention that incorporated two separate time limits.77
Although the single, one-year limit was included to decrease confusion, the application of equitable estoppel or tolling to the one-year limit has produced considerable discord among American courts.78 Equitable estoppel applies to cases in which the abductor commits bad acts, usually secreting the child in an effort to delay the start of proceedings.79 Alternatively, equitable tolling arises in situations where ex-71 Id. at 459. A preliminary draft that incorporated a discovery rule to delay the start of the time period was rejected. Id.; Weiner, supra note 25, at 434. The rejection of this rule was thought to improve the Convention because it eliminated the difficulties inherent in requiring proof of a parent's inability to determine the location of the child. Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 458-60. 76 Convention, supra note 11, art. 12; Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 459. 77 Weiner, supra note 25, at 435; see also Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 459 (noting that the single time limit was a vast improvement over a scheme with multiple time limits because this approach was clearer).
78 Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 459; Weiner, supra note 25, at 416. Compare Font Paulus, 2012 WL 2524772, at *8 (applying equitable tolling where a left-behind parent could not find child despite diligent efforts), with Matovski, 2007 WL 2600862, at *11--12 (refusing to apply equitable tolling where the child was hidden from the left-behind parent).
79 Weiner, supra note 25, at 414. traordinary events beyond the petitioner's control-and not the result of the respondent's wrongdoing-cause a delay in the start of the proceedings.80 Although the origins of the two doctrines differ, in both situations the court will delay the start of the one-year clock until the date on which the petitioner had the ability to commence proceedings in the appropriate jurisdiction.81
The Department of State, however, noted in the legal analysis it submitted to the Senate before ratification of the Convention that if a parent concealed a child's whereabouts, it was "highly questionable" whether the abductor should be able to benefit from the one-year limit in the well-settled defense.82 Several appellate and lower courts responded by applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel to the wellsettled defense in an effort to ensure that the abducting parent did not benefit from his or her own bad acts of concealing the child following the wrongful removal.83
B. American Courts' Approaches to Equitable Tolling
Several district courts have addressed whether equitable tolling should apply to the one-year limit of the well-settled doctrine.84 Origi- . . where the parent removing the child has secreted the child from the parent seeking return").
88 Duarte, 526 F.3d at 570. Despite using the term "equitable tolling," the Duarte court's analysis revealed that it relied on equitable estoppel principles. See id. (noting that equitable tolling should apply when there is evidence that the abducting parent concealed the child, and agreeing with other courts that reasoned that refusing to toll the start of the one-year time limit would reward the abducting parent for hiding the child). Although it did not fully address the issue, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated that the use of tolling for the well-settled defense was not clearly erroneous in its 2009 decision in Dietz v. Dietz. 349 F. App'x 930, 933 & n.1 (5th Cir. 2009). The Dietz court did not fully address the issue because the appellant did not raise it on appeal. Id. Despite using the term "equitable tolling," the Diez court analyzed the issue of equitable estoppel. Id. at 933 n.1 (citing Furnes, 362 F.3d at 723--24) (noting that petitioner was unsuccessful in establishing contact with her children because respondent's family was unwilling to tell her their location).
89 Duarte, 526 F.3d at 570; Furnes, 362 F.3d at 723. In Duarte, the court first noted that petitioner's claim could fail simply because of the passage of one year. Id. at 569. The court reasoned that the prejudicial effects of having an otherwise unavailable affirmative defense available to the abducing parent was largely why other courts had applied equitable tolling to the well-settled defense despite the absence of any indication in either the Convention or ICARA that such principles were to be used. . Both courts noted that the weight to be given to an agency's interpretation depended on its consistency, or lack thereof, with earlier interpretations. See Yaman, 730 F.3d at 14; Lozano, 697 F.3d at 54 n.14. The executive branch had given two previous statements on the application of equitable tolling to the well-settled defense: one in 1986 in its legal analysis of the Convention, and another in a 2006 questionnaire that examined the practical application of the Convention. See Yaman, 730 F.3d at 14-15; Lozano, 697 F.3d at 54 n.14; net/upload/wop/abd_pd02efs2006.pdf. The courts noted that both earlier executive branch statements had simply suggested that courts may consider the conduct of the abducting parent when exercising their equitable discretion after the one-year period had passed. See Yaman, 730 F.3d at 14-15; Lozano, 697 F.3d at 54 n.14. The Lozano court reasoned that these prior statements were consistent with the government's current position that equitable tolling should not apply to the Article 12 defense, but concluded that courts should consider whether the child was concealed as part of the well-settled inquiry. See 697 F.3d at 54 n.14. The First Circuit refused to give much weight to the 2006 questionnaire response because it contained no analysis of the treaty, and only stated a general policy preference against incentivizing concealment. See Yaman, 730 F.3d at 15. Lozano court's holding that the Convention's overarching goal of deterring child abduction was based on the assumption that the return of the child would be in the child's best interest.96 Both courts also recognized that the Convention's signatories had anticipated some situations, as embodied in the exceptions to the requirement of prompt return, in which the child's countervailing interests would overcome this assumption.97 Accordingly, the Lozano court concluded that allowing equitable tolling would frustrate the well-settled exception and run counter to the true goal of the Convention: protecting the child's best interests.98 The Yaman court took a somewhat softer approach, and simply held that the intentions of the Convention's drafters were unclear.99 Although the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits alluded to the purpose of the Convention when applying equitable tolling to the well-settled defense, there is nothing in the language of the Convention, its drafting history, or ICARA to support its application to situations where the abductor hid the child or administrative error caused a delay.106
The language of Article 12's well-settled defense includes a oneyear time period that is measured from the date of the wrongful removal or retention of the child to the date the left-behind parent commences proceedings.107 ICARA explicitly adopted the terms of Article 12, and parents commence proceedings when they file a petition in the court with jurisdiction over the child's location.108 Despite conceding the lack of textual support for their position, the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits held that equitable tolling should be read into the Convention in order to avoid significantly undermining the treaty's goal of deterring child abduction.109 Conversely, the First and Second Circuits, have concluded that the language of Article 12 evinces the drafters' intent to have a clear trigger date without the possibility of tolling.110 The First and Second Circuits reasoned that the drafters could have easily changed the start of the one-year period to the date n's ove e).
the child is located at the time the petition is filed .8. (1) more than a year has passed since the wrongful removal and (2) the child is settled in his or her new environment); id. § 11603(b), (f)(3) (defining "commencement of proceedings" as the filing of a petition in "any court which has the jurisdiction of such action and which is authorized to exercise its jurisdiction in the place where "); Convention, supra note 11, art. 12. 
111
In fact, the signatory states rejected the preliminary draft of the Convention, which contained a different time limit for children who had been concealed.112 A preliminary draft provided that if the child's whereabouts were known, the time period was six-months from the date of the wrongful removal.113 If the child's whereabouts were concealed, however, the six-month period would not begin until the child was discovered, allowing for a maximum of one year between the wrongful removal and the commencement of proceedings.114 The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, however, did not address the drafting history in their analysis.115 Conversely, the First and Second Circuits held that t in istory demonstrated a conscious choice on the part of the drafters to reject a different time limit when children are concealed.116
When interpreting a treaty, courts begin with the text of the treaty.117 An important piece of textual interpretation involves analyzing the drafters' intent.118 The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits spent very little time analyzing the Convention's text, and wholly ignored the drafting 119 The First and Second Circuits, on the other hand, followed the 111 See Yaman, 730 F.3d at 13; Lozano, 697 F.3d at 51 n.8. 112 Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 459 (noting that the single time limit was a vast improvement over the scheme in a preliminary draft of the Convention); Weiner, supra note 25, ccompanying text (discussing the rejection of a prelimi aft that would have included two time limits: one for children who were not con . oth the rejection of the preliminary draft with an extended time ge of international conventions and treaties. Id. at 9-10. The Cou ould thus ensure uniformity amo at 434; see supra notes 73--75 and a nary dr cealed and one for children who were concealed). 
B. Purposes of the Convention
A proper analysis of the Convention's defenses begins with the understanding that the goal of deterring child abduction is not paramount.121 The goal of deterring the abduction and concealment of children is important, but it is not the sole objective of the Convention.122 The Convention's preamble explicitly provides that "the interests of children are of paramount importance in matters relating to their custody."123 Deterrence of abduction is given a large role in the Convention but only because deterrence usually serves the interests of children.124 The swift return of abducted children based on the almost automatic recognition of a foreign custody order eliminates the benefit of abduction by ensuring that abducting parents cannot forum shop and relitigate custody disputes.125 The defenses were included, however, to recognize that that the swift return of a child is not always in the best interests of the child.126 U.S. law aims to deter child abductions, but does so without relying on equitable tolling principles.127 Parental child abduction is a crime in all states, and a parent who removes a child from the United States in into the defense. See 526 F.3d at 568--69 (citing the text of the Convention, but immediately transitioning its discussion to highlight the potentially prejudicial effects on a parent who fails to file within the one-year period). Similarly, in its 2004 decision in Furnes v. Reeves, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit briefly summarized the Convention's Article 12, but quickly changed course to cite precedent that supported the application of equitable tolling to statutes of limitations without any further textual analysis of the Convention. See 362 F.3d at 723.
120 See Yaman, 730 F.3d at 12-14; Lozano, 697 F.3d at 51--53 & n.8. 121 See Weiner, supra note 25, at 477 (arguing that courts should accept that Article 12's purpose is not to deter child abductions, but rather to recognize that settled children have an interest in a court revisiting the merits of their custody determinations).
122 Convention, supra note 11, pmbl., art. 1; Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 432; Weiner, supra note 25, at 475.
123 Convention, supra note 11, pmbl. 124 See id.; Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 431-32 (noting that the true victim of kidnapping is the child who suffers from an upset in stability, loss of contact with the left-behind parent, and frustration with adapting to a new language and culture).
125 Blynn, supra note 48, at 356; see Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 429-30. 126 Lozano, 697 F.3d at 53; Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 432. The Convention does not include a specific examination of the best interests of the child because it is a vague standard, and because in the past courts often took advantage of the vagueness to substitute their own discretion for that of the foreign custody orders. Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 431. Courts applying the doctrine of equitable tolling also reason that the one-year period is similar to a statute of limitations, which is traditionally tolled.133 Statutes of limitations provide that a plaintiff's ability to file suit expires after a designated passage of time.134 As noted by the First and Second Circuits, the one-year period in the well-settled defense is unlike statutes of limitations, because a court is not from ordering the return of a child after one year has passed.135
Even if the one-year period functioned like a statute of limitations, the lack of any Congressional intent to treat it as such undercuts the American courts applying equitable tolling to the well-settled defense insist that the overarching goal of the Convention is to deter child abductions.141 Deterring child abductions can serve multiple purposes.142 The Convention presumes that deterring child abductions protects the best interests of the child in that it seeks to place the child in a stabile environment.143 Deterring child abduction also serves to protect the custodial rights of the child's parent.144 American law views the right to the custody and care of one's child as a fundamental liberty interest that is protected by the Constitution, and deterring d ion thus fits neatly into this constitutional framework.145
The Convention, however, also includes defenses that recognize that the deterrence of child abduction through the swift return of the This Part argues that the courts that apply equitable tolling are relying on the American legal tradition of prioritizing parental rights over children's rights and interests.149 Section A demonstrates how courts that apply equitable tolling focus on parental rights to the detriment of the children's rights and interests.150 Section B argues that these co hich often minimizes the rights and interests of children.
A. The Role of Parental Rights in Equitable Tolling Decisions
The courts' strong preference for preserving the rights of parents is well-established in American law.152 This preference can be seen in ompanying text (discussing the text, drafting history ts often report physical symptoms, such as impaired sleep and loss of appetite. Id. at 616. their children absent a finding that they are unfit parents. See Trox 146 See Convention, supra note 11, arts. 12, 13, 17, 20; Pérez-Vera, supra note 13, at 432. 147 See supra notes 100--140 and acc , and purposes of the Convention). 148 See, e.g., Furnes, 362 F.3d at 723 (noting that equitable tolling is necessary to deter child abduction). Although this Note argues that children's rights should be valued more than parental rights in these circumstances, this Note still recognizes that the abduction of one's child is a traumatic event that has great effects on a parent. For example, many parents of abducted children in one study felt that the abduction was motivated by a desire to hurt them, with a much smaller percentage citing motivations of anger over the couple's separation, and a desire to be with the child. Geoffrey L. Greif & Rebecca L. Hegar, Parents Who Abduct: A Qualitative Study with Implications for Practice, Family Relations, July 1994, at 283, 284. As a result, these left-behind parents often describe a great feeling of loss, as well as feelings of rage, loneliness, fear, and severe depression. See Freeman, supra note 51, 615-16 (noting that the pain is often described as "beyond endurance"). In addition, these paren the way that the courts applying equitable tolling consider the facts of the cases before them.153 Even if the child's interests are mentioned abducting parnt to the community, family, or
The court reasoned that equitable tolling must apply to the one-year abstractly, such interests are quickly disregarded as courts focus on the rights, actions, and interests of the parents.154
For example, in 2004, in Duarte v. Bardales, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit discussed the parents' actions and interests in great detail without delving into the children's rights and interests.155 The court mentioned the concern of uprooting the children, but quickly deemed that concern was outweighed by the need to deter abductions.156 The Duarte court concluded that awarding the abducting parent with an affirmative defense would encourage the abductions and concealment of children.157 In reaching this conclusion, the court implicitly reasoned that it would be worse to award the e access to an affirmative defense than it would be to remove the children from their home of almost a year and a half.158
When the Ninth Circuit discussed whether to apply equitable tolling, it emphasized the prejudicial effects that the failure to file within one year would have on the left-behind parent.159 The court notably did not mention the children's ties friends.160 In fact, the court never analyzed the children's interests in remaining settled in the same home. 161 Similarly 161 See Duarte, 526 F.3d at 570. The court noted that it "recognize[d] the serious concerns with uprooting a child who is well settled regardless of whether the abducting parent hid the child" but stated that "significant consideration" had to be given to the deterrence of child abduction. Id.
162 See 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1363.
period to avoid rewarding a parent for abducting and concealing their children for more than a year.163 The court, however, did not mention, any concern for the effects of uprooting the children, or how applying ui in the court's reasoning to support its application of equitable tolling.172 eq table tolling would impact the children's interests. 164 When discussing the facts in Mendez Lynch, the court highlighted the parents' actions, but failed to note the interests of the children. 165 The court first detailed the wrongdoing of the abducting mother. 166 The court noted that she had taken the children while their father was on vacation without leaving any indication as to what happened to her or the children.167 The court then noted the tireless efforts of the leftbehind father in his numerous attempts to find his children. 168 The court concluded that the father's efforts over the course of eleven months were unsuccessful as a result of the mother's substantial undertaking to conceal herself and the children.169 Finally, the court noted that the father had spent time attempting to resolve the issue without resorting to court proceedings.170 Despite analyzing how the actions and interests of the parents impacted the application of equitable tolling, the Mendez Lynch court did not discuss what consideration should be given to the interests and rights of the children.171 Far from being analyzed, the children's rights and interests were not even mentioned 163 Id. As an initial matter, the court determined that the one-year period was similar to a statute of limitations. Id. at 1362--63.
164 See generally id. (applying equitable tolling without considering or mentioning any concern of the effects of uprooting the children).
165 See id. at 1363. 166 Id. 167 Id. The mother abandoned the house, sold, shipped, or donated all of its contents, and left before the father returned from his vacation. Id. at 1352.
168 Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1363. The father returned to his home in Argentina to find an empty house and immediately called friends and acquaintances to determine what had happened to his wife and children. Id. at 1352. Because no one knew where she had taken the children, the father went to the local police department to file a missing persons and robbery report. Id. The father also called airlines and immigration officials, and revoked his authorization for the children to be able to leave the country. Id. He then contacted Interpol and was able to determine that his wife had gone to the United States. Id. A month later, the father learned that his children and their mother were living in Miami, Florida, with a family with the last name Vazquez, so he called every phone number 
B. Subordination of Children's Rights and Interests in American Courts
The lack of consideration of the child's best interests in the equitable tolling cases reflects the overall subordination of children's rights to parental rights in American law.173 In contrast to parents, whose rights are largely regarded as fundamental, children were traditionally seen as objects, without rights, to be used as resources for their parents.174 The recognition of children's rights and interests has grown substantially, but remains much more amorphous than parental rights, and is most often left to varying state statutes and court decisions.175 Where children's constitutional rights are recognized, they are limited, both by the parental right to control their children and the state's power to police children's behavior.176 U.S. custody law, as with most family law issues, is determined by the individual states, and-in response to the perceived problem of unfettered judicial discretion-states began to enact legislation aimed at limiting a judge's discretion in custody determinations.177 The laws that resulted from this movement vary from state to state in the weight they give to the welfare of the child.178 These laws range from those that make the welfare of the child the sole consideration in custody disputes, to those that do not mention the welfare of the child at all as a Coupled with inconsistencies of opinion within each state, the wide variations among state statutes supports the criticism that the best interests of the child standard is too malleable and imprecise to provide any meaningful protection of children's rights.181 Some commentators have proposed that the confusion surrounding the best interests standard allows courts and legislatures to create presumptions that favor the more well-defined rights of parents even as they claim to consider the welfare of the child.182 analyzing what is in a child's best interests, the judge has discretion over what factors to consider); Zafran, supra note 174, at 178 (noting that the best interests standard has been criticized for being subjective, vague, and malleable).
182 See Stahl, supra note 181, at 821 (quoting Hillary Rodham as saying in 1973 that the best interests test is a rationalization that allows judges to make determinations about a Children's rights are not as neatly defined as parental rights, and oftentimes receive less attention than parental rights.183 These rights are largely left to a combination of case law and state legislation that do not present a clear and uniform stance on children's rights in America.184
The Supreme Court has noted that the Constitution protects minors to an extent that is limited by the need to control, discipline, and parent them.185 For example, in 1969, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, the Supreme Court held that students had the right to freely express themselves, but noted that this right might not extend to cases in which school administrators reasonably forecast that a student's expression would interfere with learning or student discipline. interests.189 This recognition is based on the law's presumption that parents act with greater maturity and experience than their children, and that the natural bonds of affection between parent and child would typically lead a parent to act in their child's best interests. 190 Some state legislation indirectly grants rights to children.191 For example, certain legislation prohibits some types of parental conduct toward children, such as physical abuse and neglect.192 These rights are also sometimes indirectly granted through the obligations that correspond with parental rights, such as the obligation to meet the health, education, and welfare needs of their child. 193 Although the rights protected vary among states, they often include the right of children to be with their natural born parents, the right to good physical care, the right to education, and the right to be protected from physical harm. 194 The eminence of parental rights also limits the ability of states to protect the constitutional and statutory rights that children enjoy. 195 For example, when a state takes actions to protect children's constitutional rights, courts ask whether the state action would be "unduly trenching" on the exercise of parental rights.196 The fear of infringing on parental rights has caused the term "children's rights" to be omitted-with few exceptions-from the titles of statutes. 197 Children's rights are not consistently recognized, and receive less attention from American courts than do parental rights.198 Although several states list child welfare as the primary consideration in custody determinations, the inconsistency of custody opinions based on similar facts has led some to postulate that the courts are merely claiming to consider the welfare of the child.199 Children's rights are defined by a jumble of case law and statutes that primarily focus on protecting children from negative adult behavior. American courts can continue to place substantial focus on parental rights when considering the well-settled defense.202 But instead of protecting parental rights through the application of equitable tolling, courts should factor their concerns about parental rights into the second prong of the well-settled defense, which asks whether the child is settled in his or her new environment.203 By taking this approach, American courts will be able to continue protecting parental rights while also remaining faithful to the text, drafting history, and goals of ing to achieve this resolution even when it is clearly in conflict with the Convention's text and drafting history. 205 The Supreme Court granted certiorari for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's 2012 decision in Lozano v. Alvarez, and is scheduled to hear oral arguments on this issue in December 2013. 206 This Part explains why the Supreme Court should reject the application of equitable tolling and how courts should conduct the well-settled inquiry.207 Section A explains why the one-year period should not be manipulated through the application of equitable tolling.208 Section B then demonstrates how courts can protect parental rights through the wellsettled inquiry and explains why this approach should be adopted.209
A. The One-Year Period Should Not Be Manipulated
When considering the Convention's well-settled defense, courts should consider only the child's best interests.210 Although important, deterrence of the abduction and concealment of children is not the only objective of the Convention.211 The Convention's preamble explicitly provides that "the interests of children are of paramount importance in matters relating to their custody."212 The defenses were included to recognize that deterrence of child abductions through the return of children is not always in the best interests of the child.213 The Convention's drafters rejected initial proposals that included extended time frames for cases in which a parent was found to have concealed the child's whereabouts.214 Thus, the single time frame represents the drafters' reasoned judgment on the best way to protect children's interests in cases with prolonged abductions. 215 Evidence supports the drafters' belief. 216 Children who have been living with the abducting parent for a long period of time report feeling a strong bond with the abducting parent.217 They also often voice anger and confusion toward the left-behind parent who did not come and get them, or may blame themselves for not making contact with the leftbehind parent.218 Further, if the children were abducted at a very young age, they might not even recognize the left-behind parent.219
The one-year limit thus functions as a recognition that abruptly separating the child from the abducting parent, and returning the child to the left-behind parent may do more harm than good.220 Thus, the second prong of the defense, the settled inquiry, ensures that this possibility is considered before the court blindly and unintentionally inflicts a second trauma on the child.221
B. Reaching the Settled Inquiry Will Not Encourage Abductions
Even if a court finds the focus on parental rights persuasive, it should embrace the settled inquiry for the same policy reason that courts have cited in support of the application of equitable tolling: deterrence of child abductions through the elimination of the benefit of concealment.222 If the court considers the issue of whether a child is settled, the court can aptly regard concealment of a child as supporting a finding that the child is not settled.223 In this way, although the abducting parent may have opened up a possible defense through concealment, the parent's actions may demonstrate that the child is not "settled."224 This would essentially eliminate the benefit of concealment, and therefore discourage a parent from taking such a drastic action.225
Courts should have little difficultly in using the fact that the child was abducted and concealed as evidence that the child is not well settled. 226 In fact, courts have already adopted a similar approach when denying abductors' claims to the defense that the child objects to the return.227 Children who are abducted for long periods of time and are isolated are more likely to express a preference for remaining with the abducting parent.228 Thus, the cases involving this defense often involve competing tensions similar to the ones present for the well-settled defense---namely, the desire to follow the text of the Convention versus the desire to prevent an abducting parent from benefitting from concealing the child.229 In response to this tension, courts have held that concealment decreases the weight that should be given to a child's preference to remain with the abductor. 230 For example, one court reasoned that a child's objection should not be accorded great weight when the abducting parent had succeeded in isolating the child for an extended period of time.231 Implicit in the court's reasoning was that the boy could not reasonably be expected to prefer his habitual residence and the left-behind parent when he had not seen either for over a year, and had only limited communication with the left-behind parent during that time.232 The court emphasized that the abducting parent's efforts to isolate the child specifically spoke to an undue influence over the child's opinion. 233 The judicial approach to the child's objection demonstrates a willingness to enter into fact-sensitive inquiries.234 Courts already analyze a child's age and maturity to determine how much weight should be given to the child's preference to remain with the abducting parent. 235 If the child is of sufficient age and maturity, the court may---but does not have an obligation to---refuse to order return based solely on the objection. 236 Courts thus have to engage in a second fact-sensitive inquiry to determine the proper weight of the child's objection.237 Courts faced with the child's objection have noted that spending a longer time with the abducting parent, especially in isolation if the child is concealed, can unfairly influence a child's preference to remain with the abducting parent.238 Thus, the courts already have engaged in fact-sensitive inquiries that measure how concealment of the child should affect the weight given to the child's objection to remain with the abducting parent. 239 Without tolling the one-year time period, the well-settled defense, just like the child's objection defense, provides little guidance to cabin a court's discretion.240 Accordingly, courts will have to analyze various facts to determine whether a child is well settled.241 Despite similar issues facing courts in confronting the child objection defense, courts have proven that they are willing to jump into the mire of a largely unguided factual inquiry.242 This inquiry will allow courts to weigh concealment when considering whether to apply the defense, just as courts have been willing and able to when considering the child objection detled.245 These courts analyze the stability of the abducting parent's lifefense. 243 Furthermore, the finding that the petition was filed after the oneyear period does not necessarily mean the child is settled. 244 Courts that have addressed the settled inquiry often find that concealed children---even if they have been in the country for more than a year---are not set- style and employment and whether the child has established family, community, and school ties.246 An abducting parent who is attempting to conceal a child may isolate the child from the community, move residences several times, switch schools, or attempt other similar tactics. 247 Courts that have addressed the settled inquiry have already used these facts to find that a child was not settled.248 Moreover, some courts have explicitly weighed active measures taken to conceal the child against a finding that the child is settled. 249 The Supreme Court should reject the use of equitable tolling, and instead instruct lower courts to reach the settled inquiry as part of an analysis that is more faithful to the text and purposes of the Convention, and still protects parental rights by deterring child abductions.250
The Court should embrace the settled inquiry as a way to remain faithful to the text of the Convention. 251 The inquiry is an explicit part of the Convention's text that should be addressed if the child was wrongfully removed or retained over a year before the commencement of proceedings. ting that the child moved frequently, did not have any family in the country, and the settled inquiry will help courts to ensure such uniformity of interpretation among all jurisdictions. 254 The settled inquiry also gives courts an opportunity to ensure that the child's interests are truly of paramount importance as required by the Convention.255 The Convention's drafters acknowledged the importance of deterrence, and that the prompt return of abducted children would serve that function. 256 The drafters felt that, in general, prompt return was in the child's best interest.257 They acknowledged, however, that such a prompt return might not be in the child's interest when a child had become settled in his or her new environment. 258 In rejecting an extended time period for children who were concealed, the drafters expressed a preference for keeping the child with the abducing parent-and thereby avoiding the retraumatization of the child through a second abrupt removal-even if this encouraged abductors to hide their children for an extended period of time. 259 Finally, the Court should embrace the settled inquiry as an opportunity to deter child abduction and protect the rights of left-behind parents.260 Just as courts have already done in cases involving children's objections to return, courts should engage the fact-sensitive settled inquiry and consider concealment as a factor against allowing the child to stay with the abducting parent.261 This approach allows the court to negate any benefit of concealment, and thus ensure that protecting parental rights remains a central concern.262
Conclusion
In adopting equitable tolling when considering the well-settled defense, American courts have placed the deterrence of child abduc-, and avoid rewardg p ttled inquiry could thus become just another refuge for the same bias.
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tions, and thus the custody rights of the left-behind parent, above all other considerations. In doing so, they have ignored the text, drafting history, and underlying purposes of the Convention. As shown by the reasoning underlying their application of equitable tolling, these courts have placed undue importance on the interests of the parent to the detriment of the child's interests. This approach mirrors the overall emphasis on parental rights in American law that limits and sometimes overrides children's rights and interests. Instead of using this approach, the courts should pursue deterrence through the well-settled inquiry by weighing abduction and concealment against a finding that the child is settled. This approach will allow courts to adhere to the text of the Convention, properly emphasize children's interests in arents who abduct and conceal their children.
Because there is little guidance in the Convention on how to conduct the settled inquiry, courts could potentially reach the settled inquiry and still continue to allow parental rights to dominate their analysis of whether the child is settled. If the Supreme Court determines that equitable tolling should not apply, the se
